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This study examines the effect of social networks and central figures in networks on 
information diffusion. Exploiting a government subsidy program and training workshops 
regarding the fair-trade and organic farming certifications in Sri Lanka, we conducted a 
randomized experiment to investigate the role of farmers’ social networks and “key farmers” 
in information transmission to workshop non-participants and their application to the 
certifications. Key farmers are agricultural village leaders unofficially appointed by local 
government officials. The estimation results show that key farmers’ involvement in the 
workshop amplifies information diffusion through social networks. In the treatment villages 
with key farmers involved, non-participants increase their knowledge of certifications and the 
likelihood of being a member of the applicant organization when directly connected with key 
farmers in their networks. Moreover, they are more likely to receive information goods from 
other peers in the network. However, in the control villages with key farmers uninvolved, direct 
connections with key farmers and farmers’ networks do not influence the diffusion of 
information goods and knowledge and participation in the applicant group. These findings 
suggest that central figures’ involvement is the key to the success of network-based programs. 
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A major concern government officials have recurrently had in agricultural societies is that 
farmers are not responsive to opportunities to adopt improved crop production technologies. 
Despite the availability of many established agricultural technologies and practices, the 
adoption rate remains considerably low in developing countries (Pierpaoli et al. 2013; 
Takahashi et al. 2019). Among several possible obstructive factors for technology 
dissemination, lack of access to information can be a significant barrier, especially for new 
technologies. Information diffusion is a vital first step in technology adoption; however, it is a 
significant weakness of developing countries, where institutions are often absent or weak 
(Anderson and Feder 2007; Aker 2011; Conley and Udry 2010; Foster and Rosenzweig 2010). 
One method that has recently attracted attention to compensate the weakness and 
promote the diffusion of agricultural information in developing countries is to utilize social 
networks. 1  The so-called network-based agriculture extension includes farm field 
demonstrations and model-farmer training, where trainee networks serve as the mode of 
information diffusion. Since the seminal works of Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Conley 
and Udry (2001), studies on the role of social networks have surged (Munsi 2004; Bandiera 
and Rasul 2006; Kondylis, Mueller, and Zhu 2017; Conley and Udry 2010; Ramirez 2013; 
Maertens 2017; Di Falco et al. 2018; Beaman and Dillon 2018; Dar et al. 2019).2 They 
documented anecdotal and empirical evidence that farmers learn through their social networks, 
not necessarily by observing every other farmer in the community. Information is localized and 
converted into common knowledge through personal ties (Vasilaky 2012), and network-based 
agricultural extension is expected to be more practical and cost-effective for information 
                                                      
1 See Takahashi et al. (2019) for the review on technology diffusion using social networks. 
2 Moreover, some studies indirectly examined the role of social networks on technology adoption by 
evaluating network-based extension programs. See, for instance, Vasilaky (2012), Beaman et al. (2018), 
Nakano et al. (2018), and Dillon et al. (2018). 
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diffusion (Feder and Umali 1993).  
In this study, we explore the effectiveness of a network-based agricultural extension 
conducted in Sri Lanka. To this end, we implemented a randomized experiment in conjunction 
with government-run training workshops regarding the fair-trade and organic farming 
certifications. Research on the effectiveness of social network-based extension programs is in 
its infancy; thus, the available evidence remains sparse. Hence, this study contributes to the 
literature on network-based agricultural extension via the case of Sri Lankan spice farmers. 
Moreover, in estimating the network effect model, disentangling the network causal effect from 
possible biases due to correlated unobservables is a challenge (Manski 1993). While empirical 
studies of social network effects generally employ restricted models relying on identification 
assumptions,3 the most rigorous approach is to randomize the networks or the introduction of 
new technology (knowledge) at the peer level. As detailed in Section 3.1 later, our experimental 
design ensures that the locations of workshop participants in village networks (and their 
knowledge regarding the certifications) are exogenously determined from observed and 
unobserved individual characteristics of non-participants. In the context of information or 
technology diffusion in agriculture, this study is the first attempt to isolate the causal network 
effect on information diffusion by utilizing a random intervention at the peer level.4 Thus, this 
study provides new evidence on agricultural information diffusion in the literature on network 
effects. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present the 
background on organic and fair-trade certifications and spice farming in Sri Lanka. Section 3 
                                                      
3 The sources of social network effects can be divided into three in Manski’s (1993) terminology: 
endogenous, contextual (exogenous), and correlated effects. In the literature, it has been often assumed 
that there are no correlated effects and only one of either endogenous or contextual effects. 
4 In fields other than agricultural information and technology diffusion in agriculture, several studies 
randomized network connections (Sacerdote 2001; Zimmerman 2003; Duflo and Saez 2003) or 
intervention at the peer level (Banerjee et al. 2012; Oster and Thornton 2012; Godlonton and Thornton 
2012; Kremer and Miguel 2007). 
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explains the research design, including a verification of the identification assumption. Section 
reports 4 the estimation results, and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Fair-trade and Organic Certifications 
In recent years, to promote environmental conservation and achieve sustainable consumption 
and production, several agricultural certification systems have been established worldwide. 
Fair-trade and organic farming certifications of interest are pioneers (Barham and Weber 2012), 
and the markets for both products have been growing steadily. The global market size for fair-
trade and organic food products has grown to 7.3 and 75.7 billion euros, respectively, as of 
2015 (Willer and Lernoud 2017). 
Fair-trade is an alternative approach to conventional international trade. It aims to 
improve living conditions and the well-being of small (and often poor) producers and laborers 
in developing countries for sustainable development through trades at a “fair” price. The key 
players in the fair-trade supply chain are classified into three categories: certification 
organizations, producers, and traders. The most prevailing certification organization in Sri 
Lank, especially for coffee and spice products, is the Fair-trade Labeling Organization 
International (FLO). Producers include small farmer organizations and plantations, and traders 
include processing and export companies. Applicants must fulfill the requirements (Fair-trade 
Standards) mandated by the FLO to obtain the FLO certification. The requirements differ per 
product and classification of producers or traders. The certification process proceeds with the 
guidance and support of an FLO subsidiary, FLOCert. When applicant organizations are 
certified successfully, the certification lasts four years, during which they can trade their 
products at the global price. If the global price falls below a certain threshold, trading at a 
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minimum floor price is guaranteed.5 Moreover, during the three-year “certification cycle,” 
regular inspections are conducted once a year by FLOCert, where they audit the certified 
organization’s compliance per the requirements. When the cycle ends, the re-certification 
process starts. As of 2017, 34 Sri Lankan farmer organizations obtained a fair-trade certificate, 
covering approximately 30,000 farmers and laborers.  
Organic certification aims to reduce the use of agrochemicals, such as chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides, and promotes “sustainable” agriculture. Many certification 
organizations provide organic certification services worldwide. Some are public, but most are 
private. These certification organizations have authorization from the International Organic 
Accreditation Service (IOAS), the authorization body of the International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM).  
As of 2019, Sri Lanka has eight international and one local certification agency (GoSL 
2019). The requirements farmers must fulfill to obtain organic certification were formulated 
according to the guidelines provided by IFOAM. Farmer organizations then obtain organic 
certification through the pre-assessment, documentation review, and field audit provided by 
certification agencies. One certification cycle lasts for a couple of years, depending on the 
certification agency. Furthermore, regular inspections are conducted by the agency, either as 
announced or unannounced visits. 
According to IFOAM statistics, the total area under organic agriculture in Sri Lanka 
in 2015 was 96,318 ha, the second-largest organic share to the total agricultural lands of a 
country in Asia (Willer and Julia 2017). Furthermore, Sri Lanka is considered the pioneer in 
the Asian region in introducing organically certified tea and cinnamon to the world market in 
                                                      
5 Another major benefit of having the certification is the fair-trade premium additionally paid to the 
producer organization, which can be used for capacity building and community development. 
Regarding the cost of having the fair-trade certification, on the other hand. it mainly comprises the 
application and annual certification fees (after certification). These application and annual certification 
fees vary depending on products and the producer-trader category. 
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2017 (GoSL 2018d). The primary market channel of organic products in Sri Lanka is exports; 
destinations include European countries, the USA, Japan, Australia, and the Middle East 
(Vidanapathirana and Wijesooriya 2014). Currently, the Sri Lankan organic agriculture sector 
comprises nearly 8,695 producers, 189 processors, and 311 exporters (Willer and Julia 2017). 
 
2.2. Spice Crop Sector and Subsidy Program in Sri Lanka 
Spice products comprise Sri Lanka’s fifth-largest export earner, accounting for 8 billion Sri 
Lanka Rupees (SLRs), or 30.7% of agricultural export earnings in 2017 (Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka 2017). Approximately 500,000 small farmers engage in spice cultivation, and over 
30,000 tons of spice products are produced annually (GoSL 2018d). The main spice products 
are cinnamon, pepper, nutmeg, clove, cardamom, and mace. Simultaneously, several 
production issues have emerged. For example, degrading soil fertility, lack of water, limited 
market facilities, and low adoption rate of new technologies render spice farmers to be less 
profitable (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2017). 
The government has identified spice production as a key to improving export 
performance in the agricultural sector, given the high demand for organic spice products in the 
world market. Favorable climate conditions, higher contributions of the small-scale sector 
(70% of production is contributed by smallholders), and minimal use of agrochemicals provide 
a great opportunity for Sri Lankan farmers to convert to organic and fair-trade certified farming 
(GoSL 2018c). 
Along with the national export policy launched in 2018, the Department of Export 
Agriculture (DEA) introduced an organic and fair-trade certification promotional program in 
September 2018 for small farms at the village level. The program includes holding training 
workshops to spice farmers and providing information and technical guidance regarding the 
certifications. Moreover, to increase the adoption rate for certifications and ensure small-scale 
7 
 
farmers’ participation, they introduced a subsidy that covers 50% of the application cost for 
certification (up to SLR 150,000 per farmer organization). 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Experiment and Household Survey 
This study conducted a randomized experiment and household survey of spice farming 
households in three districts (Kandy, Mathale, and Nuwara Eliya) in the Central Province of 
Sri Lanka. These districts are located in the central part of the island, and their economies 
heavily rely on tea, spice, and vegetable cultivation. In particular, pepper, clove, cardamom, 
nutmeg, cocoa, and cinnamon are popular spice products in these districts. 
Among the 49 spice-cultivating villages in Central Province, the DEA held one-day 
agricultural training workshops on fair-trade and organic certifications in 10 randomly selected 
villages in October 2018.6 In each village-level workshop, randomly selected 45 spice farmers 
from the 2017 voter list were invited by post,7 and the DEA provided them with specific 
information regarding fair-trade and organic certifications, including certification benefits, 
application procedures, certification requirements, and government subsidy programs. This 
information was also provided in leaflets distributed to workshop participants.8 In addition to 
certification-related information, the DEA also provided general guidance on spice farming, 
including training on agronomic practices to improve the productivity of spice cultivation. The 
list of practices includes gap-filling, shade pruning, soil conservation, mulching, fertilizer 
application, and pest and weed control. The one-day training workshop took three to four hours.  
                                                      
6 During the same period, DEA conducted another training program in randomly-selected 20 spice 
farming villages. The content of the program in these villages are a part of the content of our program. 
Therefore, spillover from these villages into our study villages is less likely. 
7 The yearly voter list by the Election Commission of Sri Lanka includes the population aged 18 and 
over. 
8 The leaflets are written in the local language, Sinhalese (see Figure A1 in Appendix A). 
8 
 
We collaborated with the DEA to implement a randomized experiment in conjunction 
with the workshops in five villages randomly selected from the 10 villages.9 We chose one 
leaflet distributor from each of the five villages (one distributor in one village) and asked them 
to distribute an additional 20 leaflets to respective villagers not invited to the training workshop. 
Moreover, to examine whether the distributor’s position in the network matters in the diffusion 
of information goods, we differentiated the distributor type. Among the initial 10 villages, four 
included key farmers as participants, and six villages did not. We then randomly selected two 
villages from the former and appointed the key farmer as the distributor (treatment group). 
Regarding the six villages with no key farmers invited, we randomly chose three villages and 
appointed a randomly selected participant as the distributor (control group). All leaflet 
distributors were men (see Figure 1 for the flowchart of the experiment). The additional 20 
leaflets consist of 10 leaflets about the fair-trade certification and 10 leaflets about the organic 
certification. Notably, the research team ensured that local officials provided no additional 
intervention in the study area. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
After the experiment, we conducted an exhaustive household survey in the five 
villages in the treatment and control groups from December 2018 to January 2019. The survey 
was conducted in the Sinhala language by trained enumerators and the sample size is 901 
households. Note that, among the 225 invited farmers in these five villages, 198 (88%) 
participated in the workshops, and invited non-participants (i.e., non-compliers) were also 
                                                      
9 Note that the reason why we selected only five villages is simply due to budget constraints. 
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included in the survey. Figure 2 shows the locations of the five villages. 
Note also that we could not conduct a baseline survey before the experiment mainly 
because of time constraints. When we joined the DEA project, the preceding training 
workshops had just started, leaving insufficient time and human resources to conduct the 
baseline survey. Thus, all information (including network connections) was collected after the 
interventions (see Figure 1), which may raise an identification issue in the network analysis 
because the social networks measured may reflect the endogenous network formation ex post 
facto. This situation is potentially a significant flaw for network analysis, as carefully discussed 
in a later section. 
The questionnaire used in the survey comprised nine sections (seven pages), including 
questions regarding social network connections and subjective fair-trade and organic 
certification knowledge, in addition to standard questions about members’ and households’ 
characteristics. Table 1 reports individual and household characteristics, such as age, education 
level, and asset holding of the sample households in our dataset. The table also presents the 
same information calculated from provincial statistics for comparison in Column 2 (GoSL 
2012; 2018a, 2018b). Respondents in our survey have quite similar characteristics to those in 
the provincial statistics. Although our study covers only five villages in Central Province, the 
table indicates that our study villages are not unusual villages in this province. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.2. Empirical Framework 
In the analysis, using a sample of workshop non-participants, we investigate information 




(1)  𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼1(?̅?𝑖𝑗 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡.-𝑉𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗) + 𝛼2(?̅?𝑖𝑗 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡.-𝑉𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗) 
+𝐱𝑖𝜷 + ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝜸 + 𝛿 ⋅ 𝐶𝑥𝑡.-𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗, 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗 denotes the outcome variable regarding fair-trade and organic certifications of 
household 𝑖  in village 𝑗 ; ?̅?𝑖𝑗  is the average outcome of peer households in the village 
networks; 𝐱𝑖 is the control for a wide variety of household characteristics of household 𝑖; ?̅?𝑖𝑗 
are the average household characteristics of the peers; 𝐶𝑥𝑡.-𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗  represents an 
indicator variable that takes unity if household 𝑖 is directly connected to the leaflet distributor 
in village 𝑗 and zero otherwise; 𝜇𝑗 denotes village-fixed effects; 𝑖𝑗 captures unobserved 
components; and 𝛼𝑘 (𝑘 = 1,2), 𝜷, 𝜸 and 𝛿 are parameters to be estimated. Note that 𝛼𝑘 
and 𝜸, coefficients on the network variables are endogenous and contextual network effects, 
respectively. We allow the endogenous effect to vary according to the treatment status, whether 
key farmers were involved in the training program. We expect that key farmers enhance the 
spillover effects of agricultural training through the network via the leadership role in 
information diffusion regarding agricultural production (i.e., 𝛼1 > 0). 
For the outcome variable (𝑦𝑖𝑗) in Equation (1), we use three different outcomes: (1) 
receiving a leaflet about fair-trade or organic certification, (2) fair-trade and organic 
certification knowledge, and (3) application for fair-trade or organic certification. Regarding 
farmers’ subjective certification knowledge, we employed the sum of correct answers to 19 
questions regarding certifications. The 19 questions were based on the information provided in 
the training and leaflets. 10  Regarding the leaflet receipt, enumerators checked whether 
households held a leaflet: If they reported that they received a leaflet but could not show it, 
enumerators confirmed whether they threw it away, passed it to another person, or misplaced 
it. Moreover, as a double-check, enumerators interviewed distributors to obtain the details of 
                                                      
10 Moreover, to control respondents’ cognitive ability, we also control the sum of correct answers to ten 
simple mathematics and general knowledge questions regarding domestic and international affairs. 
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those to whom they gave the leaflets. Note also that we did not prohibit the creation of 
photocopies of the leaflets; in some villages, photocopied leaflets were circulated.11 Regarding 
the certification application, which is based on the group application principle, we obtained the 
names of all farmers participating in village applicant groups from the DEA. 
Regarding the network variables in Equation (1), the average outcome (?̅?𝑖𝑗) and average 
household characteristics (?̅?𝑖𝑗) of peer households in the village networks are calculated based 








′ 𝐗𝑗. 𝑊𝑖𝑗 is an 
(𝑛𝑗 × 1) vector, and its 𝑘-th element takes unity when household 𝑖 has a direct connection to 
the 𝑘-th household and zero otherwise.12 In this study, social networks denoted by 𝑊𝑖𝑗 are 
defined based on undirected connections, in which bilateral relations among farmers do not 
distinguish between senders and receivers. 𝑌𝑗  is an ( 𝑛𝑗 × 1 ) vector of all households’ 
outcomes in the village, and 𝐗𝑗 is an (𝑛𝑗 × 𝑘) vector containing all household characteristics 
in the village. Note that 𝑛𝑗 is the number of households in village 𝑗 . Thus, we implicitly 
assume that the network works only within the village. This is because we focus on the newly 
provided information on agricultural certifications, and, thus, diffusion from neighboring 
villages not included in the training experiment is virtually impossible. Therefore, this 
assumption is not just a simplification of reality but is also plausible in the present context. 
Regarding the measurement of social networks, we investigated network connections 
in several dimensions by asking the following six questions: 
N1. If you faced a farming problem, whom would you ask for advice or information?  
N2. To whom do you give advice or information regarding a farming problem? 
N3. To (from) whom do you give (receive) food products produced in your home 
garden without monetary payments and profits? 
                                                      
11 Specifically, six copies in a treatment village and ten copies in a control village were circulated. 
12 Note that the 𝑖-th element in 𝑊𝑖𝑗  is also zero. 
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N4. If you need rice, wheat, sugar, or other goods, to whom would you go? 
N5. If you suddenly need 1,000 rupees, from whom would you ask for money? 
N6. From whom do you ask for information about politics and government policies? 
The questions N1 and N2 were asked separately for a) spice cultivation, b) vegetable cultivation, 
c) fruit crop cultivation, and d) tea or coconut cultivation. 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the main empirical variables in the analysis. 
Note that we restrict the sample to those not invited to the training program and, therefore, the 
sample size is 676 (= 901−225). As discussed in the next subsection, by limiting the sample to 
the non-invitees, we attempt to eliminate the possible endogeneity caused by two-way 
interactions and isolate the network effect, 𝛽𝑘. Regarding household characteristics (𝐱𝑖) not 
reported here, we employ demographic characteristics, asset holdings, agricultural production, 
and other social connections (for the descriptive statistics of these variables, see Table B1 in 
Appendix B). 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
3.3. Check on the Validity the Identification Strategy 
To identify the coefficients of interest, 𝛽𝑘 , several concerns must be addressed. First, the 
possible interaction between 𝑦𝑖𝑗 and ?̅?𝑖𝑗 may raise the reflection problem (Manski 1993), 
causing the coefficients of ?̅?𝑖𝑗 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡.-𝑉𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 and ?̅?𝑖𝑗 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡.-𝑉𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 to be biased. 
The reflection problem in the endogenous effect stems from the two-way exchange of 
information; thus, if we can extract the information flow only from ?̅?𝑖𝑗 to 𝑦𝑖𝑗, it is possible to 
eliminate the problem of the interaction. Thus, we address this issue by using a randomized 
training workshop program. Specifically, we employ the average outcome of the workshop 
participants in the network, denoted by ?̅?𝑖𝑗
∗ , as an instrument for ?̅?𝑖𝑗. The training provided 
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information on the certifications to randomly invited farmers, and their certification knowledge 
is a key determinant of ?̅?𝑖𝑗. On the other hand, the sample farmers used in the analysis consist 
of those who were not invited to the training and, therefore, could not provide any additional 
information to the participants. Therefore, ?̅?𝑖𝑗
∗  can be seen as an exogenous shifter of ?̅?𝑖𝑗 in 
the sense that it is not correlated with non-participants’ potential knowledge. ?̅?𝑖𝑗








∗ , where 𝑊𝑖𝑗
∗   is an ( 𝑛𝑗 × 1 ) vector denoting household 𝑖 ’s 
connections to workshop participants in village 𝑗 and 𝑌𝑗
∗ is an (𝑛𝑗 × 1) vector containing the 
participants’ outcomes. We then utilize the instrumental variable (IV) regression technique, 
employing ?̅?𝑖𝑗
∗ × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡.-𝑉𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗  and ?̅?𝑖𝑗
∗ × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡.-𝑉𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗  as instruments for ?̅?𝑖𝑗 ×
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡.-𝑉𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 and ?̅?𝑖𝑗 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡.-𝑉𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗. 
The second potential threat to identification is the issue of endogenous network 
formation. The formation of social networks with peers and neighbors is an outcome of 
household decisions, which may be the main source of bias due to the “correlated effect” 
(Manski 1993). However, the IV estimation explained above can essentially eliminate the 
influence of endogenous network formation. Even though the formation itself is endogenous 
and the network variable (?̅?𝑖𝑗) is correlated with unobserved characteristics of members in the 
network, the outcome (knowledge and leaflet) provided to randomly invited farmers (?̅?𝑖𝑗
∗ ) is 
considered independent from unobservables. 
Nevertheless, endogeneity in network formation may still be problematic in our 
research design. As explained in the previous subsection, we conducted the household survey 
after the experiment due to a time constraint. Hence, non-participants might have created new 
connections to participants to obtain information about the workshop and subsidy program. To 
address this possibility, when constructing the network variables (?̅?𝑖𝑗, ?̅?𝑖𝑗
∗ ), we exclude the 
networks for agricultural information sharing, specifically N1 and N2. The networks employed 
are those for lending food products or other goods, borrowing money, and sharing information 
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on politics and government policies (N3 to N6). Thus, we assume that our experiment does not 
change the networks, except for the network to share agricultural information.  
To check the validity of this identification assumption, we examine the possible impact 
of workshop participation on network formation. Table 3 reports the regression results where 
the dependent variables are the number of connections to workshop participants (Columns 1 
and 2), and connections to non-participants (Columns 3 and 4). The table shows that the 
coefficients of participation are positive, implying that the workshop participants created new 
network connections after the training. In particular, when connections were measured based 
on the networks for agricultural information sharing (Columns 1 and 3), the coefficients are 
large. Thus, we cannot deny the possibility that our experiment altered the network connections 
in the study villages. However, when using the networks irrelevant to agricultural information 
sharing (Columns 2 and 4), the magnitude decreases. Although there is still a statistically 
significant relationship between workshop participation and network formation among 
participants (Column 2), the impact of workshop participation for connections between 
participants and non-participants is small and statistically insignificant (Column 4). We cannot 
strongly claim that new connections between participants and non-participants were not formed 
after the experiment, but potential influences from the endogenous network formation seem 
small.  
In Figure 3, we present the network connections irrelevant to agricultural information 
sharing (i.e., N3 to N6) in the treatment (Panel A) and control villages (Panel B). Circles 
represent households (the numbers in the circles are the household IDs), and lines denote the 
links between households in the network. Moreover, yellow and green circles represent the key 
farmers and leaflet distributors. The figure also exhibits the persons with the highest degree 
(red circles), betweenness (blue circles), and eigenvector (black circles) centralities. As already 
mentioned, the key farmer in a village is an agricultural leader unofficially appointed by local 
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government officials at the village level and is usually in the hub of village farmer networks. 
The figure shows that the key farmers in all villages are the central figures in the networks in 
terms of these three centrality measures. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
Furthermore, we verify the treatment exogeneity. The treatment in the experiment was 
whether key farmers were appointed to the leaflet distributors, which was implemented at the 
village level. Because of its randomness, we expect that the treatment status is independent of 
observed and unobserved household characteristics. However, we must verify this issue 
carefully since our sample villages are only five and the village-level heterogeneity might 
confound the treatment status by coincidence. Thus, to check this possibility, we conduct a 
balancing test and compare several key characteristics between the treatment and control 
groups (Table 4). In Panel A of Table 4, we compare the treatment and control villages on the 
observed household characteristics. The results show no statistically significant differences in 
household head’s characteristics (Panel A), holding of durable consumer goods (Panel B), 
agricultural production (Panel C), and network connections (Panel E). Thus, the balancing test 
indicates that the households in the two groups are homogeneous. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Diffusion to Non-Participants 
We start by investigating the role of the key farmer and social network in information diffusion, 
focusing on information goods (i.e., leaflets of the fair-trade and organic certifications) and 
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subjective certification knowledge. The estimation results for leaflet diffusion are presented in 
Columns (1) to (4) in Table 5, and those for knowledge diffusion are presented in Columns (5) 
to (8). Note also that we report the OLS results with and without village-fixed effects and their 
corresponding IV estimation results. 
Looking at the first row in Columns (1) to (4), the coefficient estimates on “direct 
connection to distributor” are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or less and 
considerably stable in all specifications. As expected, non-participants directly connected to 
the appointed distributor were more likely to receive the leaflet. We can also see the importance 
of the distributor connection for the diffusion of certification knowledge (Columns 5 to 8): 
farmers connected to the distributor chose two more correct answers to the 19 questions about 
certifications than farmers without a connection.  
Turning to the network effect, the network has a significant impact on leaflet diffusion 
only in the treatment villages but not in the control villages. This indicates that the diffusion of 
information goods from the network is reinforced when key farmers participate in the training 
workshops and are appointed as leaflet distributors. On the other hand, we found no network 
effect for knowledge diffusion in either the treatment or control villages.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
We then examine the effect of key farmers’ involvement and networks on the 
application of fair-trade and organic certifications. Table 6 shows that the network has no 
impact on the application, while the connection to the distributor consistently increases the 
likelihood of joining the village applicant group. If we interpret “Network × treatment village” 
as an indirect influence from the key farmer and “Direct connection to the distributor” as a 
direct influence, behavioral responses may be stimulated only through more direct interaction. 
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The following subsection further explores the role of key farmers in the direct connection. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4.2. Further Investigation on the Direct Connection to the Key Farmer 
Table 7 reports the estimation results, including the direct connection to key farmers. We allow 
the coefficient to vary according to the treatment status (with key farmers involved or not) 
because key farmers in treatment villages were also distributors, while those in control villages 
were not.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Table 7 presents an interesting contrast in the role of the distributor’s position in the 
network between leaflet diffusion and knowledge diffusion. When the leaflet distributor was a 
key farmer (i.e., the treatment villages), the direct connection to the distributor improves 
certification knowledge but not the likelihood of receiving a leaflet. However, when the leaflet 
distributor was randomly assigned to a farmer (i.e., the control villages), the direct connection 
to the distributor improves the likelihood of receiving a leaflet but not the certification 
knowledge. This result indicates that the key farmer varies the information transmission mode: 
to farmers in his network, he mainly transmits information orally; however, to farmers outside 
of his network, he mainly uses an information good (leaflet). Looking at the application for 
certifications, as in knowledge diffusion, the key farmer promotes the certification application 
mainly through direct communication.  
Taken together, the estimation results suggest that key farmers promote the diffusion 
of information goods indirectly through village networks and further accelerates knowledge 
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diffusion and application via direct communication. Thus, key farmer involvement is the key 
to the success of network-based programs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examined key farmers’ and social networks’ role in the diffusion of leaflets and 
knowledge regarding fair-trade and organic certifications and application to them. It employed 
a field experiment, where workshop participants and leaflet distributors were randomly 
selected. 
The main findings are as follows. Key farmers’ involvement amplifies information 
transmission to workshop non-participants. Non-participating farmers in the treatment villages 
(with key farmers involved) are more likely to obtain certification knowledge and join the 
village applicant organization when directly connected with key farmers in their networks. 
However, in the control villages (with key farmers uninvolved), the direct connection with key 
farmers does not influence knowledge diffusion and farmers’ application behavior.  
These findings provide important policy implications for extending agriculture in 
developing countries, where social network-based agricultural extension methods have been 
practiced recently. That is, central figures’ involvement is the key to the success of network-
based extensions. The findings imply that farmers’ knowledge and application behavior are 
accelerated through direct communication with their role model. However, a remaining issue 
is how to diffuse information to those with no connection to key farmers. Thus, future studies 







Aker, Jenny C. 2011. “Dial ‘A’ for Agriculture: A Review of Information and Communication 
Technologies for Agricultural Extension in Developing Countries.” Agricultural 
Economics 42(6): 631–647.  
Anderson, Jock R., and Gershon Feder. 2007. “Agricultural Extension.” In Handbook of 
Agricultural Economics Vol. 3, edited by Robert Evenson and Prabhu Pingali, 2343–
2378. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Bandiera, Oriana, and Imran Rasul. 2006. “Social Networks and Technology Adoption in 
Northern Mozambique.” The Economic Journal 116(514): 869–902.  
Banerjee, Abhijit, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, Esther Duflo, and Matthew O. Jackson. 2013. “The 
Diffusion of Microfinance.” Science 341(6144): 1236498–1236498.  
Barham, Bradford L., and Jeremy G. Weber. 2012. “The Economic Sustainability of Certified 
Coffee: Recent Evidence from Mexico and Peru.” World Development 40(6): 1269–
1279.   
Beaman, Lori, Ariel BenYishay, Jeremy Magruder, and Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak. 2018. “Can 
Network Theory-Based Targeting Increase Technology Adoption?” NBER Working 
Paper No. 24912. National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge.  
Beaman, Lori, and Andrew Dillon. 2018. “Diffusion of Agricultural Information within Social 
Networks: Evidence on Gender Inequalities from Mali.” Journal of Development 
Economics 133: 147–161.  
Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 2017. “Economic and Social Statistic of Sri Lanka.” Retrieved 
March 25, 2021, from https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_ 
documents/statistics/otherpub/Economic_%26_Social_Statistics_of_SL_2017_e.pdf 
Conley, Timothy G., and Christopher R. Udry. 2001. “Social Learning through Networks: The 
Adoption of New Agricultural Technologies in Ghana.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 83(3): 668–673.  
Conley, Timothy G., and Christopher R. Udry. 2010. “Learning about a New Technology: 
Pineapple in Ghana.” American Economic Review 100(1): 35–69.  
Dar, Manzoor H., Alain de Janvry, Kyle Emerick, Erin M. Kelley, and Elisabeth Sadoulet. 2019. 
“Endogenous Information Sharing and the Gains from using Network Information to 
Maximize Technology Adoption.” CEPR Discussion Paper 13507. 
20 
 
Di Falco, Salvatore, Francesco Feri, Paolo Pin, and Xavier Vollenweider. 2018. “Ties that Bind: 
Network Redistributive Pressure and Economic Decisions in Village Economies.” 
Journal of Development Economics 131: 123–131.   
Dillon, Andrew, Maria Porter, and Aissatou Ouedraogo. 2018. “Social Network Targeting of 
Agricultural Technology: Adoption, Input Substitution and Yield Effects.” Selected 
Paper Prepared for Presentation at the 2018 Agricultural & Applied Economics 
Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., August 5-August 7. 
Feder, Gershon, and Dina L. Umali. 1993. “The Adoption of Agricultural Innovations: A 
Review.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 43(3–4): 215–239.   
Foster, Andrew D., and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 1995. “Learning by Doing and Learning from 
Others: Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture.” Journal of Political 
Economy 103(6): 1176–1209.   
⸻⸻⸻ 2010. “Microeconomics of Technology Adoption.” Annual Review Economics 2(1): 
395–424.   
Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL). 2012. Census of Population and Housing 2012—Final 
Report. Department of Census and Statistics. 
⸻⸻⸻ 2018a. Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2016—Final Report. Department 
of Census and Statistics.  
⸻⸻⸻ 2018b. General Report: Economic Census 2013/14 Agricultural Activities Sri Lanka. 
Department of Census and Statistics.  
⸻⸻⸻ 2018c. National Export Strategy of Sri Lanka 2018 to 2022: Spices and Concentrates 
Strategy. Ministry of Development Strategies and International Trade. 
⸻⸻⸻ 2018d. Spice Crop statistics. Department of Export Agriculture.  
Kondylis, Florence, Valerie Mueller, and Jessica Zhu. 2017. “Seeing is Believing? Evidence 
from an Extension Network Experiment.” Journal of Development Economics 125: 1–
20.  
Manski, Charles F. 1993. “Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection 
Problem” Review of Economic Studies 60(3): 531–542 
Maertens, Annemie. 2017. “Who Cares What Others Think (or Do)? Social Learning and Social 
Pressures in Cotton Farming in India.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
99(4): 988–1007.   
21 
 
Maertens, Annemie, and Christopher B. Barrett. 2013. “Measuring Social Networks' Effects on 
Agricultural Technology Adoption.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
95(2): 353–359.  
Mekonnen, Daniel Ayalew, Nicolas Gerber, and Julia Anna Matz. 2018. “Gendered Social 
Networks, Agricultural Innovations, and Farm Productivity in Ethiopia.” World 
Development 105: 321–335.   
Nakano, Yuko, Takuji W. Tsusaka, Takeshi Aida, and Valerien O. Pede. 2018. “Is Farmer-to-
Farmer Extension Effective? The Impact of Training on Technology Adoption and Rice 
Farming Productivity in Tanzania.” World Development 105 (2018): 336–351.   
Ramirez, Ana. 2013. “The Influence of Social Networks on Agricultural Technology Adoption.” 
Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences 79 (2013): 101–116.   
Sacerdote, Bruce. 2001. “Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth 
Roommates.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(2): 681–704.  
Takahashi, Kazushi, Rie Muraoka, and Keijiro Otsuka. 2020. “Technology Adoption, Impact, 
and Extension in Developing Countries’ Agriculture: A Review of the Recent 
Literature.” Agricultural Economics 51(1): 31–45.  
Vasilaky, Kathryn. 2013. “Female Social Networks and Farmer Training: Can Randomized 
Information Exchange Improve Outcomes?” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 95(2): 376–383. 
Vidanapathirana, Ruvini, and Nalaka Wijesooriya. 2014. Export Market for Organic Food: 
Present Status, Constraints, and Future Scope. Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian 
Research and Training Institute. Retrieved March 25 2021, from 
http://www.harti.gov.lk/images/download/reasearch_report/new1/167.pdf 
Willer, Helga, and Julia Lernoud. 2017. The world of organic agriculture. Statistics and 






Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Research flowchart 
 

















Figure 3. The social network in the study villages 
Panel A: Treatment villages 
(1) Village A (N = 170) 
 
(2) Village B (N = 141) 
 
 
Panel B: Control villages 
(1) Village C (N = 232) 
 








Note: Circles represent households in the networks irrelevant to agricultural information sharing, while 
lines represent the links between the households. 




Table 1. Sample characteristics and comparison with provincial representative data 
 
Our survey data 




  Mean   Mean 
Age of agriculture workers 52.7  51.2 a) 
Years of education of agriculture workers 8.982  8.121 a), b) 
Land size (acres)  0.88  1.27 a) 
Asset holding: households with     
   1/4 acre of land or more 76%  62% a), b) 
   house made of permanent floor  95.2%  92.8% c) 
   house made of permanent wall 99.4%  96.6% c) 
   electricity 100.0%  88.7% a) 
   TV 89.1%  87.7% c) 
   radio 67.7%  73.1% c) 
   mobile phone  88.2%  89.1% c) 
   computer  12.4%  18.8% c) 
   automobile (car/van) 4.2%  7.7% c) 
   motorbike 20.2%  18.1% c) 
Notes: This table compares the mean and percentage values of several social and economic characteristics 
between the sample in our survey and those in provincial representative surveys in the Central Province in 
Sri Lanka. 
Source: Figures in Column 1 were calculated using data from the author’s survey conducted on December 
15, 2018, to January 25, 2019. Figures in Column 2 were based on a) the 2013–2014 economic census for 
agriculture activities in Sri Lanka (GoSL 2018b), b) the final report of the 2012 Census of population and 







Table 2. Summary statistics of main empirical variables 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Dependent variable      
Knowledge about FT & ORG certifications 676 2.572 4.545 0 19 
Receiving leaflet about FT/ORG certification 676 0.085 0.280 0 1 
Application for FT/ORG certification 676 0.045 0.209 0 1 
Panel B: Treatment and network variables      
Central famer village 676 0.326 0.469 0 1 
N/w avg.: knowledge about FT & ORG certifications 676 5.803 5.054 0 19 
N/w avg.: Receiving leaflet about FT/ORG certification 676 0.381 0.366 0 1 
N/w avg.: Application for FT/ORG certification 676 0.126 0.256 0 1 
Direct connection to key farmer 676 0.147 0.355 0 1 
Panel C: Instrumental variables      
Part. avg.: knowledge about FT & ORG certifications 676 3.603 4.466 0 19 
Part. avg.: Receiving leaflet about FT/ORG certification 676 0.304 0.350 0 1 
Part. avg.: Application for FT/ORG certification 676 0.086 0.219 0 1 
Notes: This table reports the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum of main variables used in the information diffusion, leaflet diffusion, and application of fair-
trade and organic certification analysis.  






Table 3. Workshop participation and the formation of new networks 
Dependent variable 
Number of connections to 
participants in the network 
 
Number of connections to non-






(N1 + N2) 
Other 
networks  






(N1 + N2) 
Other 
networks  
(N3 to N6) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Workshop participation 1.955** 0.843**  1.988** 0.352 
 (0.471) (0.248)  (0.697) (0.255) 
HH characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Village-fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 901 901  901 901 
R-squared 0.203 0.083  0.092 0.070 
Notes: This table reports the estimates of network formation, where the dependent variable is the 
number of social network connections. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 






Table 4. Balancing test of household and network characteristics 
 Control (training with  
key farmers uninvited) 
 Treatment (training with 
key farmers invited) 
 Difference 
 N Mean Std. Dev.  N Mean Std. Dev.  (2) − (5) Std. Err. 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
A) Household head’s characteristics 
Age 455 52.116 13.062  221 53.226 12.665  −1.109 1.060 
Female 455 0.202 0.402  221 0.249 0.433  −0.046 0.034 
Years of education 455 8.476 3.458  221 8.375 4.121  0.101 0.302 
B) Household characteristics 
Household size 455 3.14 1.398  221 3.14 1.526  0.004 0.118 
# of sleeping rooms 455 2.971 1.020  221 3.081 1.133  −0.110 0.087 
# of TVs 455 0.883 0.015  221 0.873 0.333  0.010 0.026 
# of mobile phones 455 0.872 0.334  221 0.886 0.021  −0.014 0.027 
C) Agricultural production 
Pepper production (Kg) 455 243.197 228.257  221 459.357 453.960  14.939 37.519 
Land cultivated (acre) 455 0.854 1.220  221 0.842 0.776  0.012 0.090 
D) Network characteristics 
# of connections 455 2.578 6.493  221 2.158 1.614  0.419 0.443 
# of connections to invitees 455 0.813 0.848  221 0.755 0.833  0.057 0.186 
Connection to key farmer 455 0.309 0.462  221 0.276 0.448  0.034 0.376 
Notes: Columns 1 to 6 report the number of observations, mean, and standard deviation of the observed 
household treatment and control group characteristics. Columns 7 and 8 report the difference in means 
between the control and treatment groups and stand error, respectively. 





Table 5. Effect on the diffusion of leaflets and agricultural information 
Dependent variables: Receiving leaflets of certifications   Knowledge about certifications 
 OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Direct connection to distributor 0.088** 0.087**  0.087*** 0.087***  2.097* 2.127**  2.073*** 2.098*** 
 (0.031) (0.031)  (0.026) (0.026)  (0.760) (0.754)  (0.646) (0.645) 
Network (receiving leaflet or knowledge of peoples in the network)          
   × treatment village 
(key farmer involved) 
0.205*** 0.206***  0.219*** 0.221***  0.046 0.021  0.111 0.106 
(0.021) (0.018)  (0.040) (0.037)  (0.094) (0.100)  (0.114) (0.119) 
   × control village 
(key farmer uninvolved) 
0.002 0.005  0.001 -0.003  -0.057 -0.078  -0.064 -0.077 
(0.019) (0.014)  (0.033) (0.035)  (0.056) (0.045)  (0.073) (0.073) 
Treatment village 0.103***   0.087***   1.483**   1.461***  
 (0.022)   (0.026)   (0.487)   (0.428)  
HH characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
HH average characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Village FE No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 676 676  676 676  676 676  676 676 
R-squared 0.233 0.189  0.233 0.235  0.326 0.244  0.324 0.338 
First-stage F statistics for:             
  Network × control village    1,569.7 1,485.7     32.8 42.4 
  Network × treatment village    1,092.9 1,176.0     176.9 313.9 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients of interest based on Equation (1). All standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. ***, **, and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 





Table 6. Effect on the certification application 
 OLS  IV 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Direct connection to distributor 0.071* 0.070*  0.071*** 0.070*** 
 (0.031) (0.031)  (0.027) (0.026) 
Network (certification application of peoples in the network)    
   × treatment village 
(key farmer involved) 
0.05 0.022  0.056 0.032 
(0.087) (0.088)  (0.082) (0.082) 
   × control village 
(key farmer uninvolved) 
0.066 0.056  0.051 0.054 
(0.044) (0.039)  (0.057) (0.047) 
Treatment village 0.029   0.030  
 (0.025) 
  (0.021)  
HH characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
HH average characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Village FE No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 676 676  676 676 
R-squared 0.135 0.126  0.135 0.152 
First-stage F statistics for:       
  Network × control village    4190.497 4445.454 
  Network × treatment village    6575.854 2636.658 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient of interest based on Equation (1). All standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the village level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 




Table 7. Further checks on the role of the key farmer (IV estimation) 
Dependent variables: Leaflet  Knowledge  Application 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Direct connection to          
   distributor in control village 0.123*** 0.124***  0.904 0.998*  0.043* 0.032 
 (0.031) (0.031)  (0.578) (0.520)  (0.024) (0.028) 
   key farmer (=distributor) in treatment village 0.047 0.043  3.403*** 3.352***  0.103*** 0.113*** 
 (0.030) (0.031)  (0.790) (0.807)  (0.018) (0.020) 
   key farmer in control village -0.012 -0.016*  0.522* 0.391  0.026 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.008)  (0.290) (0.306)  (0.018) (0.014) 
Network (ave. outcome of peers in the network)       
   × treatment village (key farmer involved) 0.229*** 0.231***  0.090 0.087  0.049 0.024 
 (0.040) (0.036)  (0.107) (0.112)  (0.081) (0.080) 
   × control village (key farmer uninvolved) -0.002 -0.006  -0.059 -0.069  0.048 0.061 
 (0.035) (0.036)  (0.074) (0.074)  (0.060) (0.050) 
Treatment (key farmer involved) village 0.109***   1.982***   0.046**  
 (0.015)   (0.318)   (0.023)  
HH characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
HH average characteristics Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Village FE No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 676 676  676 676  676 676 
R-squared 0.234 0.237  0.334 0.347  0.138 0.155 
First-stage F statistics for:          
  Network × control village 4,445.5 1,600.0  32.8 41.4  5,334.2 3,930.9 
  Network × treatment village 2,636.7 1,473.8  177.3 255.9  2,412.4 2,287.3 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient of interest based on Equation (1) with additional variables. All standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ estimation from our survey data. 
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Appendix A: Fair-trade and organic leaflets 
Figures A1 and A2 present the leaflets we distributed during the training and experiments. 
 
[Insert Figures A1 and A2 here] 
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Appendix B: Summary Statistics of Control Variables 
Table B1 reports the summary statistics of all control variables (𝐱𝑖).  
 
[Insert Table B1 here] 
 
Panel A presents the demographic characteristics, indicating that the average age of 
household heads is 53 years, and the average family size is less than four members. Moreover, 
89% of the households are headed by males, and household heads’ average years of schooling 
is approximately 8.5 years. Further, 38% of the sample household heads are full-time farmers, 
while 24% of the sample engaged in farming with monthly wage employment. 
Panel B describes household assets and housing characteristics. It shows that more 
than 95% of the villagers have well-constructed houses with two or more sleeping rooms. All 
households had electricity in the five villages. Considering housing equipment, more than 53% 
of the people use refrigerators in their homes, and 53% of households use rice cookers. Further, 
89% of households have television, and 67% own radio sets. On average, 1.6 households use 
mobile phones, and more than 88% use mobile connections for their daily communication. 
Approximately 12% owned a computer on average. Most people in the five villages have 
motorbikes, accounting for about 20% of households, while 14.8% and 2.8% have three-
wheelers and cars, respectively. 
Pepper, nutmeg mace, clove, and cardamom are the main spice products of the five 
villages, the sales of which depend on the village- and regional-level collectors. The average 
cultivation spans 0.8 acres, varying from zero to 15 acres. The average yield of pepper was 306 
kg (wet weight) per household in the 2018 harvesting year. 
Panel D presents the social connections of households in the five villages. It indicates 
that 22% of the sample households connect with regional-level agricultural extension officers, 
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and 59% can contact village-level extension officers. Moreover, 99% are members of a welfare 
society in the village, and 24% hold an official position in a welfare society. Further, on average, 
households spend 88, 21, and 16 minutes watching television, listening to the radio, and reading 
newspapers per week, respectively. Finally, 11% of the villagers exchange information with 
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Table B1. Summary statistics of control variables 




Panel A: Demographic characteristics      
Household head’s general knowledge 676 6.500 2.132 0 10 
Household head’s age 676 52.507 12.858 18 90 
Female headed household  676 0.217 0.412 0 1 
Household head’s years of education 676 8.443 3.685 0 17 
Household head’s job: full time farmer 676 0.389 0.487 0 1 
Household head’s job: wage employer  676 0.242 0.428 0 1 
Household size 676 3.143 1.441 1 7 
Panel B: Asset holding      
Live family own house  676 0.973 0.161 0 1 
# of bed rooms in the home 676 3.008 1.061 0 9 
Permanent roofing (0=cadjan, straw, leaf material) 676 0.994 0.076 0 1 
Permanent floor (0=clay, sand) 676 0.946 0.224 0 1 
Permanent wall (0=clay, cadjan, leaf material) 676 0.994 0.076 0 1 
Electricity availability for lighting  676 1.000 0.000 1 1 
Refrigerator  676 0.544 0.498 0 1 
Rice cooker 676 0.541 0.498 0 1 
TV 676 0.880 0.324 0 1 
# of radios 676 0.686 0.47 0 2 
# of mobile phones 676 1.588 1.021 0 6 
# of fixed telephones 676 0.181 0.389 0 2 
Computer  676 0.109 0.312 0 1 
Motor bike 676 0.199 0.401 0 1 
# of three-wheelers 676 0.146 0.385 0 3 
Car 676 0.031 0.173 0 1 
Panel C: Agricultural production       
Pepper yield (kg) per household 676 238.742 457.179 0 5000 
Land use for cultivation (acer) 676 0.857 1.107 0 15 
Panel D: Other social connections      
Contact with export agriculture officer  676 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Contact with village agriculture officer  676 0.554 0.497 0 1 
Bearing official position in village-level welfare 
society last 5 years (Bearing official position=1) 676 0.187 0.391 0 1 
Time spend to watch TV last week (minutes) 676 89.361 74.875 0 600 
Times spend to listen to the radio last week (minutes) 676 20.872 51.125 0 600 
Time spend to read newspaper in last week (minutes) 676 15.196 31.126 0 180 
Sharing agriculture information with outside people of 
the village 676 0.106 0.308 0 1 
 
